Last edited Sat May 24, 2025, 01:04 PM - Edit history (1)
The procedure to recover the plane was already released but not followed correctly by the Ethiopian pilots, the Co-pilot was woefully inexperienced, leaving the Captain task saturated.
The first officer only had 361 flight hours logged, including only 207 hours on the Boeing 737.
NTSB findings:
Appropriate crew management of the event, per the procedures that existed at the time, would have allowed the crew to recover the airplane even when faced with the uncommanded nose-down inputs.
The BEA also submitted comments to the draft final report
During the accident flight, the flight crew did not make appropriate use of the associated applicable procedures on which he had received training in the preceding months.
The Captain's attempts to engage AP was in contradiction with the Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery maneuver check list, which was expected to be applied in reaction to the stick shaker activation.
Degradation of the CRM which started immediately after the AOA vane failure and which didn't help the crew take the necessary actions to keep the plane under control although they had received an adequate recurrent training on situations that occurred in the accident flight.
The preliminary report asserts that the thrust remained at takeoff setting (94% N1) and the throttles did not move for the entire flight.
They literally just had to switch off the MCAS breaker and use the manual trim wheel.
The full throttle setting made manual trimming near impossible.